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1 Introduction
One of the most important changes in the institutional landscape of many advanced coun-
tries’ labor markets has been a strong decline in unionization and collective bargaining
coverage. Panel (a) of Figure 1 shows the development of two key indicators in this respect
in the OECD countries. The ﬁrst is union density, measured as the share of union mem-
bers in total employment, and the second is the collective bargaining coverage rate, which
refers to the share of workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement and, hence,
centralized wage negotiations. Between 1990 and 2010, union density declined from 26 to
18 percent and collective bargaining coverage dropped from 43 to 35 percent. It is evident
from Panel (b) that there is substantial variation across countries, reﬂecting their diﬀerent
institutional settings.1 However, the general pattern is quite pervasive, with 18 out of the
24 countries (with the available data) experiencing a decline in the collective bargaining
coverage rate, 3 a constant rate and only 3 an increase.
The consequences of this decline in unionization and collective bargaining coverage have
been widely discussed in the related literature, where the considered outcome variables
include wage inequality (e.g. DiNardo et al., 1996; Card et al., 2004), demographic employ-
ment patterns (Bertola et al., 2007), macro performance (Mitchell and Erickson, 2005), or
the extent of international outsourcing (Lommerud et al., 2009).
The reasons for this decline are less clear, however. Acemoglu et al. (2001) posit that
skill-biased technical change has been an important driver. Their argument is that, by
increasing the outside option for skilled workers, technical change undermines the coalition
among skilled and unskilled workers in the formation of unions. Another explanation is
structural change in advanced economies (Hirsch, 2008), the idea being that unionization
declines due to employment reallocation from unionized to non-unionized industries.
In this paper, we focus on an alternative explanation: globalization, and in particular
increased exposure to low-wage country import competition. Moreover, we explore changes
in bargaining regimes at the level of the employer, instead of looking at the formation of
unions at the workers’ side. This ﬁts the institutional setting in Germany, the focus of our
analysis.
Germany is an interesting case in point, for two main reasons. First, Germany experi-
enced a strong decline in collective bargaining coverage in the recent past. From 1996 to
2008, our period of analysis, the share of establishments covered by a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) fell from 58 to 35 percent.2 The major part of this decline was driven
by a decrease in industry-wide collective agreements, which implied a decentralization of
the wage setting process from the industry level to the level of the individual ﬁrm. This
remarkable shift has been hinted at as a source of increased German competitiveness (Dust-
mann et al., 2014), but also as a major driver of rising wage inequality (Dustmann et al.,
2009; Antonczyk et al., 2010; Baumgarten et al., 2018; Biewen and Seckler, 2017). The
second reason is that Germany’s trade exposure increased greatly during the same period
1A good overview of the different institutional settings is given in OECD (2017).
2These numbers are based the IAB Establishment Panel. Details on this data set are provided in Section 4.
The numbers differ from the ones obtained from the OECD in Figure 1, Panel (b), because the latter are based
on the share of workers (as opposed to establishments) covered by a collective agreement.
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(a) OECD-wide trends (in %)
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(b) CB coverage rate across countries (in %)
Sources: OECD (2017), online data appendix at https://doi.org/10.1787/empl_outlook-2017-8-en, ac-
cessed June 26, 2019; and OECD.Stat (https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CBC, accessed June
26, 2019.
Notes: Panel (b) includes all OECD countries with available data for the years 1990 and 2010 (or the closest
possible year within a range of ±2 years). The stated values for 2010 refer to 2008 for Belgium, 2009 for France
and Norway, and 2011 for Luxembourg and Sweden.
Figure 1. Trends in collective bargaining coverage and unionization
of time. Much of it has been due to two major globalization shocks which originated in
predominantly labor-abundant countries with substantially lower wages than Germany: on
the one hand the rise of China and its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001 and on the other hand the fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent transformation
of the former socialist countries into market economies. Over the period from 1996 to 2008,
our period of analysis, German imports from China and Eastern Europe – in the following
referred to as “the East”3– grew by more than 300 percent (from 42 billion euros in 1996 to
182 billion euros in 2008, measured in constant year-2000 terms).4
In this paper, we explore to what extent the decline in industry-wide CBAs can be
causally attributed to the rise in import competition from China and Eastern Europe.
Our hypothesis is that an increase in import penetration on ﬁnal goods markets is likely
to induce some ﬁrms to opt out of collective wage agreements, both because particularly
smaller, less productive ﬁrms ﬁnd it increasingly diﬃcult to pay union wages and because
workers are more willing to accept an opting-out decision if their employers face a credible
threat of going bankrupt or downsize production.5 For our analysis, we exploit variation in
3The East covers China and the following Central and Eastern European countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the former USSR or its succession states Russian Federation, Be-
larus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
4Of course, Germany also increased its export volumes to China and Eastern Europe over the respective time
period. Figure 2 in Section 4 illustrates the evolution of German import and export volumes with respect to
both regions.
5That globalization and the firm’s choice of leaving industry-wide collective bargaining might be linked, is
also backed up by anecdotal evidence. For example, the agricultural machinery producer Amazone from Northern
Germany left industry-wide collective bargaining in 2012, claiming that it wanted to become “more flexible and
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changes in import (and export) exposure both across three-digit industries as well as over
time and relate them to establishments’ changes of their bargaining regime. To identify a
causal relationship, we apply the instrumental variable strategy pioneered by Autor et al.
(2013) and instrument trade ﬂows between Germany and the East by trade ﬂows between
the East and other high-income countries.
Our results can be summarized as follows. We ﬁnd that an increase in import com-
petition from China and Eastern Europe over the period from 1996 to 2008 induces es-
tablishments to leave centralized collective bargaining regimes. In terms of magnitude, we
conclude that the increase in import exposure explains about 19 percent of the overall de-
cline in industry-wide CBAs in the German manufacturing sector. In contrast, we do not
ﬁnd, on average, any eﬀect of increased export opportunities on establishments’ decisions to
change their collective bargaining status. Furthermore, an analysis of heterogeneous eﬀects
reveals that it is the small and medium-sized plants that react most strongly to an increase
in import penetration.
Our paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. First, we analyze a new
dimension of how ﬁrms react to increased import competition. This channel is important,
since changes in collective bargaining coverage have been shown to inﬂuence a host of eco-
nomic and labor market outcomes. We therefore shed light on an indirect, albeit important
link between international trade and labor market outcomes that, to our knowledge, has
been largely neglected in the existing literature. Our second, more general contribution
is that we stress the endogeneity of labor market institutions. Most existing trade models
treat labor market institutions as exogenous. To the extent that international trade changes
bargaining regimes, this exogeneity assumptions is challenged and should lead to modiﬁed
trade models that treat labor market institutions as endogenous.
Closest to our paper is a short paper by Carluccio et al. (2016) that analyzes the link
between ﬁrm-level importing/oﬀshoring as well as exporting and the propensity to sign a
ﬁrm-level collective agreement in France. Contrary to our ﬁndings, their results indicate
that exporting is positively related to a ﬁrm’s probability of signing a ﬁrm-level agree-
ment while importing/oﬀshoring has no signiﬁcant eﬀect. Our paper diﬀers from theirs in
important respects. Most importantly, the institutional setting is diﬀerent in France and
Germany. In France, industry-level wage agreements deﬁne wage ﬂoors by occupations that
are binding for all ﬁrms in the speciﬁc industry, and ﬁrm agreements are optional and on top
of these industry agreements. Therefore, Carluccio et al. (2016) interpret these ﬁrm-level
agreements as a way of additional rent sharing. In contrast, in Germany, industry-wide
collective agreements with their implied wage ﬂoors are only binding for the ﬁrms that
sign them. Firms are free to pay more than than the negotiated wage ﬂoors regardless.
We explicitly address the issue of leaving industry-wide collective bargaining and think of
leaving ﬁrms as the ones seeking more downward wage (and general employment) ﬂexibility.
Based on these diﬀerences in the institutional set-up, we also have a diﬀerent mechanism
better positioned for global competition” (authors’ translation; source in German: http://www.wochenblatt.
com/landwirtschaft/nachrichten/amazone-verlaesst-arbeitgeberverband-4871.html, last accessed June
26, 2019). Needless to say, these claims need to be taken with a grain of salt as globalization might be an easy
scapegoat for an unpopular decision, but they further motivate a systematic analysis based on representative
data.
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in mind and choose a diﬀerent source of variation. Looking at the question through a
heterogeneous-ﬁrm lens, we expect the ﬁrms most likely to suﬀer from increased foreign
competition – and hence potentially most inclined to leave collective bargaining – to be the
smallest and least productive ones in an industry, and these are usually not the ones that
engage in international trade themselves. Hence, we measure import (and export) exposure
at the industry level as opposed to the ﬁrm or plant level.
In addition, our analysis relates to the following strands of the literature. First, we
add to the empirical literature that analyzes the causal eﬀects of import competition (from
low-wage countries) on diﬀerent margins of ﬁrm adjustment, such as employment growth
and survival (Bernard et al., 2006), innovation (Bloom et al., 2016; Autor et al., 2019), skill
upgrading (Mion and Zhu, 2013), and changes in the product mix (Bernard et al., 2010).
Within this strand of the literature, our identiﬁcation strategy builds on the inﬂuen-
tial study by Autor et al. (2013) and their follow-ups. In their analysis of the US labor
market consequences from increased Chinese import competition, they account for unob-
served shocks that simultaneously aﬀect imports and labor market outcomes by using trade
ﬂows from China to other high income countries as an instrument for US trade exposure,
thereby only exploiting the “supply shock element” of Chinese import competition. They
ﬁnd severe negative eﬀects on US manufacturing employment. An excellent overview of
follow-up and related research is given in Autor et al. (2016). Dauth et al. (2014) apply
the same empirical strategy to the German context. They, however, do not only focus on
China, but also consider trade with nearby Eastern Europe, whose rise and opening-up
resembles the one of China in several respects. Moreover, Dauth et al. (2014) investigate
the eﬀects induced by both increased import competition and rising export opportunities.
Taking both channels into account, they ﬁnd that trade with China and Eastern Europe
has contributed to retaining employment in the manufacturing sector in Germany.
In their initial paper, Autor et al. (2013) measure trade exposure at the level of local la-
bor markets by apportioning national industry-level trade ﬂows to regions according to their
share of national industry employment so that they are able to capture both the direct eﬀect
on import-competing employers and indirect eﬀects in the surrounding geographic area. In
this paper, however, we measure trade exposure at the industry level as in Autor et al.
(2014) or Dauth et al. (2016), thereby focusing on the ﬁrst-order direct eﬀect on employ-
ers in the import-competing (or export-oriented) industry. Relying on industry-level trade
ﬂows has further advantages in our context. On the one hand, in the German institutional
setting, employers and unions are usually also organized at the level of industries. On the
other hand, we avoid the potential pitfalls of using a shift-share type of instrument that
have recently been highlighted in a number of papers (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2018;
Borusyak et al., 2018; Adao et al., 2018).
Second, our research relates to a more speciﬁc literature that deals with ﬁrm or estab-
lishment determinants of the choice of the bargaining regime (e.g. Schnabel et al., 2006)
and with reasons to leave centralized wage bargaining (Kohaut and Schnabel, 2003) in Ger-
many. This literature, however, does not explore the role of increased trade exposure, nor
does it aim at the causal identiﬁcation of eﬀects. Further contributions that theoretically
model the endogenous choice of diﬀerent bargaining regimes at the level of the ﬁrm are
5
discussed in Section 3.
Finally, at a more general level, this paper also speaks to the trade-and-institutions lit-
erature as summarized in Nunn and Treﬂer (2014). A large part of this literature analyzes
the role of domestic institutions as a source of comparative advantage, where some papers
have indeed focused on labor market institutions. Egger et al. (2015b) show that diﬀer-
ences in unionization rates across countries can be a source of comparative advantage and,
therefore, shape trade patterns. Other labor market institutions that have been considered
in this context are worker monitoring capabilities (Costinot, 2009), labor market protection
regulations (Tang, 2012), and overall labor market ﬂexibility (Cuñat and Melitz, 2012). We
focus on the other direction of causality and analyze to what extent trade shapes domestic
labor market institutions.6
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional
background and the system of industrial relations in Germany. Section 3 discusses the
theoretical background and formulates the working hypothesis. The data employed in our
analysis is introduced in Section 4. Section 5 describes our empirical approach, before the
results are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Institutional background
The German system of industrial relations is based on the principle of autonomy of wage
bargaining, which is rooted in Article 9 III of the German constitution. It implies that the
right to negotiate over wages and working conditions is assigned only to the labor market
parties, that is employers, employer associations, and trade unions. The principle of wage
bargaining autonomy guarantees that the process of industrial relations is independent of
the government or the political process. Diﬀerent from many other countries, industrial
relations are therefore based on contracts and mutual agreements and are not rooted in
legislation.7 Moreover, Germany has introduced a statutory minimum wage only after our
period of analysis (in 2015).
Collective agreements are negotiated either at the region-industry level or at the ﬁrm
level. They typically cover arrangements with respect to wages, working hours, and other
aspects of working conditions. Collectively bargained wages generally act as minimum
6In this context, Dreher and Gaston (2007) have analyzed the importance of globalization, in a much broader
sense, on deunionization in a macroeconomic cross-country setting. Our analysis, however, departs from their
contribution in several important respects. First, we analyze the relationship between trade exposure and the
decline in collective bargaining within one country, exploiting variation across industries and plants. This way,
we circumvent any issues relating to (unobserved) cross-country heterogeneity, which might hinder the proper
identification of parameters. In addition, by focusing on establishments, our unit of analysis corresponds to the
economic entity which actually decides on the bargaining regime, at least in Germany, and we are able to control
for many establishment-level characteristics. Second, and relatedly, we focus on collective bargaing coverage as
opposed to union density, where the former is the relevant variable for determining how many workers are covered
by centralized wage negotiations. Third, we focus on a clearly defined aspect of globalization, increased trade
exposure to low-wage countries. Fourth, our empirical approach allows us to establish causal effects.
7An exception are so called “Allgemeinverbindlichkeitserklärungen”. In exceptional cases, the government can
declare a collective agreement legally binding for all firms in an industry, including employers and employees that
originally were not covered. Since the legal requirements for these government-extended collective agreements
are quite high, they play only a minor role today. In 1996, (2010) 4.1% (1.5%) of all collective agreements were
declared generally binding. The majority of these apply to the construction sector. See Bispinck (2012) and
Schulten and Bispinck (2013) for further information.
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wages. Payments above the union wage – the so-called wage cushion or wage drift – are
common (Dustmann and Schönberg, 2009). On average, wages in establishments covered
by collective agreements are higher than in uncovered ones (e.g. Guertzgen, 2016), but also
less responsive to ﬁrm-speciﬁc quasi-rents (Guertzgen, 2009). As a result, wage dispersion
is more compressed in the covered sector. In line with this evidence, Hirsch and Mueller
(2018) ﬁnd that collective bargaining coverage is associated with a positive wage premium
at the ﬁrst decile of the wage premium distribution, but not at the ninth decile.
A special feature of the German institutional setting is that the recognition of trade
unions is at the discretion of the ﬁrm. This implies that collective contracts cover only
workers that are employed in ﬁrms that recognize the relevant collective agreement – and
this is generally true whether the worker is a union member or not.8 On average, collective
agreements in Germany are formed for a period of 22 months.9 During this period, a duty
not to engage in industrial disputes holds.
Firms that once have recognized a collective contract can choose to opt out at their own
discretion. They can do so by leaving the respective employer association or by becoming a
so-called “OT member“ (OT = “ohne Tarif”, i.e. without collective agreement), which gives
employers the possibility to be a member of the association without being covered by the
collective agreement, thereby still beneﬁting from other services. If a ﬁrm leaves its asso-
ciation or changes membership, this does not instantly terminate the collective agreement.
Instead, the employer has to stick to the agreement until it ends (“Nachwirkungsfrist“).
During this period, however, the collective agreement does not apply anymore to new hires,
nor is the ﬁrm obliged to honor newly negotiated wage increases. After the expiration of an
agreement, new employment and wage contracts can be formed. Over time, a ﬁrm there-
fore may be able to lower wage costs and increase employment ﬂexibility by opting out of
a collective agreement.
Over the last couple of years so-called opening or hardship clauses have also gained
importance (see Brändle et al., 2011 and Bispinck et al., 2010). These clauses allow ﬁrms to
temporarily deviate from some collectively agreed standards in times of economic diﬃculties.
The ﬁrm is, however, expected to return to the general conditions of the original agreement
after a predeﬁned period. Another characteristic feature of the German system of industrial
relations is that a considerable fraction of ﬁrms not oﬃcially bound by an (industry-wide)
collective agreement states that it is “oriented” toward one and follows its basic features.
Since the fraction of self-declared orienting establishments has increased over time, Addison
et al. (2016) ask whether the erosion thesis is “overblown”. However, according to their
results, orientation and true coverage seem to be imperfect substitutes at best. First, the
increase in orientation is substantially smaller than the decrease in coverage of industry-wide
collective agreements. Second, both in the cross-section and when following establishments
that leave collective bargaining over time, wages in orienting establishments are lower than
in establishments covered by industry-wide agreements. Finally, orientation is not legally
8From a legal perspective, a collective agreement is only binding for union members of a firm. However, the
employer generally extends the agreement conditions to all (comparable) workers to weaken workers’ incentives
to become a union member. Due to this practice, collective bargaining coverage rates are generally higher than
union membership rates (see Fitzenberger et al., 2013).
9See http://www.boeckler.de/wsi-tarifarchiv_4832.htm, last accessed June 26, 2019.
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binding and may be “a weak policy tool as ﬁrms can withdraw from the terms set in the
agreement at any time or just pick-and-choose the elements of the agreement they like”
(OECD, 2017, p. 144).
3 Theoretical background and working hypothesis
Although there is a long-standing literature on the eﬀects of trade (liberalization) on labor
market outcomes in the presence of unionization (e.g. Brander and Spencer, 1988; Bastos
and Kreickemeier, 2009), it oﬀers little guidance for our empirical analysis. This is because
in these models, unionization is a ﬁxed country and/or industry characteristic and thus
exogenous.10
More relevant for our analysis therefore is a strand of literature which considers the
endogenous choice of wage bargaining regimes – without focusing on globalization eﬀects,
however. While some papers deal with the endogenous formation of unions on the worker
side (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001), most relevant are those papers which consider the endoge-
nous choice of the bargaining regime on the employer’s part, which ﬁts the institutional
setting in Germany (cf. Section 2).
One example is Jimeno and Thomas (2013). They consider an economy with search
and matching frictions, ﬁrm-speciﬁc productivity shocks and ﬁrm-level and sector-level
bargaining. Part of their analysis is about an efficient-opting-out scenario where all ﬁrms
are ex-ante covered by a centralized wage regime, but ﬁrms and workers can mutually
agree to move from sector-level bargaining to ﬁrm-level bargaining. In this framework, the
productivity threshold below which workers are laid oﬀ is higher in the centralized than
in the decentralized regime, as the wages paid by ﬁrms do not respond to ﬁrm-speciﬁc
(negative) productivity shocks. This implies that the least productive ﬁrms which cannot
aﬀord to pay collective wages opt out of CBAs. Their employees accept the opting-out since
they would otherwise lose their jobs.
In another paper, Baumann and Brändle (2017) establish a link between the extent of
collective bargaining coverage and the degree of productivity dispersion within an industry.
In their model, the choice of the bargaining regime is based on the tradeoﬀ between wage
costs and ﬁxed transaction/negotiation costs, which are assumed to be higher under de-
centralized bargaining. They show that a more dispersed productivity distribution among
ﬁrms leads to lower collective bargaining coverage, as a uniform wage becomes unattractive
for a larger fraction of ﬁrms. They further predict that less productive ﬁrms are most likely
to follow a fully decentralized wage regime, as for them the burden of a uniform wage is
greatest.11
Hirsch et al. (2014) put forward the argument of a “hide eﬀect”, according to which
high productivity ﬁrms self-select into centralized wage regimes since it allows them to hide
behind less productive ﬁrms. The underlying idea is that under a decentralized regime,
ﬁrms pay wages according to their own productivity, while under centralized bargaining,
10In the model of Bastos and Kreickemeier (2009), deunionization is modeled as a decrease in the share of
unionized sectors, but again exogenous with respect to trade liberalization.
11The transaction-cost savings argument is also central to the paper by Capuano et al. (2014), which essentially
arrives at the same prediction.
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the wage is based on an industry average or some other aggregate reference point.
Thus, despite highlighting diﬀerent mechanisms, all of these models share the prediction
that the smallest, least productive ﬁrms will prefer decentralized wage bargaining. In
contrast, larger, more productive ﬁrms will opt for centralized wage regimes.12
As outlined above, these models remain silent about the eﬀects of increased trade ex-
posure or globalization. We argue, however, that the models are nevertheless informative
regarding the likely impact of increasing trade exposure, as the latter will aﬀect the size
(and proﬁt) distribution within an industry, with direct implications for ﬁrms’ choices of
their bargaining regime. Workhorse heterogeneous-ﬁrm trade models such as Melitz (2003)
predict that the largest, exporting ﬁrms expand and the smaller, purely domestic ﬁrms
contract in reaction to increasing trade liberalization.
Thus, we expect increased import exposure to induce some ﬁrms – in particular the
smaller, less productive ﬁrms – to opt out of a centralized collective bargaining regime
in order to lower wage costs and increase employment ﬂexibility. Likewise, we expect
employees to be more likely to accept an opting-out decision if they face a credible threat
of losing their jobs. In contrast, increased export exposure should beneﬁt the largest ﬁrms
and thus lead to less exits from or even more entry into centralized bargaining agreements
among this subset of ﬁrms.13
We should note that the mechanism we have in mind relates primarily to increases
in ﬁnal goods trade exposure. We acknowledge however that the rise of the East also
implies an increase in the opportunities of oﬀshoring, i.e. the threat of relocating (parts of)
the production abroad, which constitutes an alternative mechanism through which ﬁrms
and employees might be inﬂuenced in their decision to agree upon leaving a centralized
bargaining regime. The reasoning in Dustmann et al. (2014) refers to this second channel.
They argue that German ﬁrms were able to increase their bargaining position signiﬁcantly
after the transformation of Central and Eastern Europe since this development made it
credible that German ﬁrms might relocate production. Although we are not going to test
this second channel explicitly, we will discuss to what extent our results might capture this
alternative mechanism.
12Only the model by Baumann and Brändle (2017) deviates slightly in this respect. While they do share the
prediction that the least productive firms opt for fully decentralized wage bargaining, they also predict that the
most productive firms will be subject to firm-level collective bargaining. The latter prediction, however, is based
on the assumption that unions can force these firm-specific agreements upon the firm, at the expense of some
fixed costs.
13The mechanism we have in mind is related to, but also different from the one proposed by Do and Levchenko
(2009). They analyze theoretically the relationship between international trade and the quality of economic
institutions – modeled as costs of firm entry – in a setting with heterogeneous firms. They assume that political
(lobbying) power of firms is directly linked to firm size and that larger firms prefer to set higher costs of entry,
ceteris paribus, to reduce competition. As trade leads to a more unequal distribution of firm size, it shifts political
power towards larger firms, which can in turn lead to worse institutions (i.e. higher entry costs). The difference
with respect to our setting is that the institution in Do and Levchenko (2009) applies to all firms. In the case of
collective bargaining, however, while it is conceivable that larger firms can tilt the terms of collective agreements
in their favor, smaller firms have the possibility to opt out.
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Figure 2. German trade volumes in (year-2000) billion euros, 1996–2008
4 Data
Trade Data For our analysis, we use data on international trade from the BACI Database,
which is provided by the CEPII and builds on the UN Comtrade Database. It contains
detailed bilateral trade statistics for more than 200 countries and 5,000 products. We
aggregate the product-level trade data to the three-digit industry level (in the WZ93 clas-
siﬁcation, which is equivalent to NACE Rev.1). Trade values are converted into year-2000
euros using exchange rates and consumer price indices supplied by the German Bundesbank
and the German Statistical Oﬃce, respectively. Figure 2 shows the evolution of German
import and export volumes from/to China and Eastern Europe in the aggregate. It can
be seen that the German economy experienced a sizable increase in trade volumes with
respect to both regions. Dauth et al. (2014) discuss in detail that this increase in trade
exposure was much larger than with respect to any other German trading partner in the
world, making it the major trade shock that hit the German economy during the last two
decades – and one which originated primarily from low-wage countries.
Establishment Data Our establishment-level data are based on the IAB Establishment
Panel (EP), which is provided by the Research Data Centre of the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB).14 The EP is a stratiﬁed random sample of all German establishments which
employ at least one worker covered by social security. Strata are deﬁned over three dimen-
sions: regions, industries, and size classes. Appropriate weights are provided to ensure the
representativeness of the data. The EP started in 1993 with 4,265 establishments in West
Germany. East German establishments were included from 1996 onwards. After taking
14More precisely, this study uses the Linked-Employer-Employee Data (LIAB) [cross-sectional model 2 1993–
2010 (LIAB QM2 9310)] from the IAB, which combines the EP with social security records on individual workers
(see below). Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal
Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) and subsequently remote data access.
See Ellguth et al. (2014) for further details on the EP and Heining et al. (2013) for a detailed description of the
LIAB data.
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Figure 3. Decline in collective bargaining coverage in Germany, 1996–2008
in several waves of additional establishments, the sample size increased to about 16,000
in 2008. Although participation is voluntary, the response rate of repeatedly interviewed
establishments is high, amounting to about 80 percent. We augment the data from the
EP with selected variables from the Employment Statistics. The latter are administrative
social security records of all workers who were employed in one of the establishments as of
the 30th of June of a given year. We aggregate these worker-level data to the establishment
level. As a consequence, we drop establishments from the EP that cannot be linked to the
social security data. We also drop establishments where the reporting unit changed over
time since we will exploit the panel dimension in our analysis and changes in the reporting
unit might be associated with spurious changes in the bargaining regime and the control
variables.
The resulting data set is very rich. For our analysis at hand, information regarding the
collective bargaining regime of an establishment is most important, which is available from
1996 onwards (1995 for West Germany). It is surveyed every year in the EP and distin-
guishes between collective agreements at the industry level, the ﬁrm level, and no collective
agreement. Other important establishment-level variables for our analysis are the industry
aﬃliation of the plant at the three-digit level, the region of the workplace, establishment size
(in terms of employees and sales), establishment age, its legal form, information on whether
it has a works council, whether it is part of a larger group, its export behavior and its tech-
nological status as well as information about its workforce composition. Figure 3 displays
the evolution of collective bargaining coverage in Germany. It becomes apparent that, from
the mid 1990s onwards, there was a strong decline in collective bargaining coverage rates.
Most of this development was due to a decrease of industry-wide agreements. While in 1996
about 49 percent of all establishments were covered by an industry-wide contract, this share
declined to only 33 percent in 2008 (Panel (a)). The share of plants covered by ﬁrm-level
contracts declined from about 10 to 3 percent over the same time period. Moreover, the
decline in CBAs is not (primarily) driven by shifts in the sectoral employment share, but
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also found within sectors. The manufacturing sector shows the strongest decline, where
the share of plants covered by an industry-wide agreement declined from 54 percent to 32
percent over the period of analysis (Panel (b)). While the observed decline is partly driven
by establishment turnover, with newly founded establishments being less likely to follow
collective agreements than older (and exiting) ones (Card et al., 2013), to a great extent
it reﬂects previously covered establishments leaving collective agreements. We will provide
evidence on the latter when discussing our dependent variable.
We combine both data sets by harmonizing industry and product classiﬁcations and
merging trade ﬂows to the EP. We restrict our analysis to the years from 1996 (which is the
ﬁrst year we observe information on CBAs for all the plants in the panel) to the year 2008
(to ensure that our analysis is not confounded by the global economic crisis). Moreover, we
focus on the manufacturing sector since this is where we have detailed trade information
for. We end up with 1,563 (1996) to 2,926 (2008) plants each year in our unbalanced raw
panel data.
Supplementary Data In our analysis, we normalize trade volumes with total em-
ployment. For the industry-level employment data, we rely on the Sample of Integrated
Employment Biographies (SIAB), a two-percent random sample of administrative social
security records. For our empirical analysis, we keep observations for the 30th of June of
every year and aggregate the individual-level data to the three-digit industry level (and
multiply the values by 50). To supplement our main analysis, we also make use of the 1995
input-output-table from the German Statistical Oﬃce. We exploit this source to distin-
guish ﬁnal goods imports from overall imports. A ﬁnal data source which we consult for a
robustness exercise is the number of migrants from China and Eastern Europe per German
district and year. Details on the construction of the latter two data sets can be found in
the Appendix.
5 Empirical approach
For our empirical strategy, we closely follow previous work by Autor et al. (2013, 2014)
and Dauth et al. (2014, 2016). In particular, we make use of the fact that the productivity
rise in China as well as the fall of the Iron Curtain and the subsequent transformation of
the former socialist countries happened quickly and to a large extent exogenously from the
point of view of Germany. Moreover, this increase in trade exposure aﬀected Germany and
many other countries alike.
In order to investigate how the rise in trade exposure to China and Eastern Europe
aﬀected German plants in adjusting their collective bargaining regime, we relate changes
in a plant’s bargaining status to changes in import and export exposure to the East. We
ﬁrst discuss how we measure the exogenous increase in trade exposure, before we turn to
the exact deﬁnition of changes in the collective bargaining status at the establishment level.
We elaborate on the exact empirical speciﬁcation at the end of this section.
Trade exposure to the East Our main measure of trade exposure is the change in
import penetration for each three-digit industry j of the manufacturing sector between t
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and t+∆ , which is deﬁned as:
∆IMEastjt =
∆IMD←Eastjt
Ej,95
, (1)
where ∆IMD←Eastjt corresponds to the total change in German imports from the East in
industry j between t and t + ∆. We normalize trade volumes with total employment in
industry j in the pre-sample period, Ej,95. Our measure of import exposure, ∆IM
East
jt ,
therefore captures the per-capita change in imports for industry j between t and t +∆.15
One concern regarding the use of (1) in our empirical analysis is that it might also cap-
ture domestic shocks that aﬀect both ﬁrm-level outcomes and German import demand.
To extract only the supply-driven component in (1), we instrument for German import
exposure by using the change in imports of other high-income countries vis-a-vis the East,
constructing the following variable:
∆IMOEastjt =
∆IMOther←Eastjt
Ej,95
, (2)
where ∆IMOther←Eastjt now corresponds to changes in total import ﬂows of industry j
from the East to other high-income countries between t and t + ∆.16 Moreover, in the
denominator, we ﬁx employment as of the year 1995 to address potential issues of reverse
causality if employment reacted in anticipation of future trade exposure. Note that we
construct both measures ((1) and (2)) also with respect to export exposure:
∆EXEastjt =
∆EXD→Eastjt
Ej,95
, (3)
and
∆EXOEastjt =
∆EXOther→Eastjt
Ej,95
. (4)
Changes in collective bargaining We measure the collective bargaining status of
plant i at time t with a dummy variable, CBit, that indicates whether the establishment
recognizes an industry-wide collective agreement or not. We consider this information to
be the most relevant for our analysis since most of the variation in collective bargaining
coverage rates relates to industry-wide as opposed to ﬁrm-level agreements (see Figure 3).
15Table 8 in the Appendix lists the industries that experienced the largest increase in import penetration per
worker.
16This instrumental variable approach has been developed by Autor et al. (2013) and applied to Germany by
Dauth et al. (2014). We follow the latter and consider the following countries as instrument countries: Australia,
New Zealand, Japan, Singapore, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and the UK. The underlying assumption is that those
countries are similarly affected by the rise of the East while industry demand shocks across Germany and those
other high-income countries are largely uncorrelated.
13
Table 1. Changes in collective bargaining coverage at the establishment level (in %)
N CBA exit No change CBA entry
∆CBit -1 0 +1
1996–1999 797 18.23 76.37 5.41
1999–2002 1010 3.75 87.11 9.14
2002–2005 1763 8.13 87.51 4.36
2005–2008 1772 9.06 87.44 3.50
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, regression sample. Notes:
Sampling weights are employed.
Furthermore, switching from an industry-level agreement to either a ﬁrm-level agreement
or no collective agreement at all captures the idea of an increasing decentralization of the
wage setting process, which we are after. As our dependent variable, we deﬁne the change
in the collective bargaining status at the establishment level between t and t+∆, ∆CBit.
It can take the value 0 if establishment i has not changed its bargaining status, −1 if the
plant has left an industry-wide agreement, and +1 if the establishment has joined such an
agreement between t and t+∆.17, 18
When choosing the interval length ∆, we aim to ﬁnd the optimal balance between two
diﬀerent objectives. On the one hand, ∆ should not be too small since we have to take into
account that establishments might react to a change in economic conditions only with a
certain time lag. Moreover, we need to consider that establishments that are willing to leave
a collective agreement are still bound by the latter until it expires. Thus, the probability of
observing a change in the plant’s bargaining regime increases with the length of ∆. On the
other hand, ∆ should not be too large since panel attrition and the ensuing reduction in
sample size as well as sample selectivity would increasingly compromise the analysis. For
example, if we chose ∆ = 12 (from 1996 to 2008), we would only observe 211 plants in
our sample, preventing a reasonable analysis. Taking this trade-oﬀ into account, we opt
for three-year windows. Since our analysis covers the years 1996 to 2008, we end up with
four stacked three-year diﬀerences: 1996–99, 1999–02, 2002–05, and 2005–08. Tables 1 and
2 show descriptive statistics of the dependent variable as well as the trade measures for the
respective time periods.
As can be seen, we observe between 3.8 and 18.2 percent of establishments leaving
industry-wide collective bargaining agreements each period. At the same time, between 3.5
and 9.1 percent of plants are observed to enter CBAs. Although these numbers refer to
our restricted sample of establishments that can be observed at the beginning and the end
17Since we want to capture permanent changes in a plants’ bargaining status, we impute the CBA variables,
when an establishment reports a different status only for one year (and switches back to the previous status
directly in the next period). In such a case, we ignore the switch and adjust the CBA variable. We provide
details on this imputation in the Appendix. Generally, our results are not sensitive to this adjustment.
18An alternative strategy could have been to measure the dependent variable not at the plant, but at the
industry level. However, at the level of disaggregate industries, cell sizes would become too small and represen-
tativeness can no longer be ensured. As the Research Data Center points out (see Fischer et al., 2008, p.21),
representative aggregate figures can only be obtained at the aggregation level of the variables that define the
sampling strata. Since the strata industry dimension is quite aggregated – in 1996 there are only 16 strata
industries and only 3 of them are in the manufacturing sector –, a meaningful industry-level analysis is not
feasible. It is however possible to conduct a valid establishment-level analysis since one can explicitly control for
the strata-defining variables, and thereby for the sampling probability, in the regression. See Fischer et al. (2008)
for a detailed discussion.
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Table 2. Changes in import and export exposure
N est. N ind. mean sd
1996–1999
Change in imports 797 80 2.37 5.26
Change in imports, instrumented 797 80 4.03 10.35
Change in exports 797 80 0.89 2.53
Change in exports, instrumented 797 80 1.12 4.63
1999–2002
Change in imports 1010 84 2.57 6.50
Change in imports, instrumented 1010 84 7.53 17.26
Change in exports 1010 84 1.81 2.81
Change in exports, instrumented 1010 84 1.76 5.12
2002–2005
Change in imports 1763 87 1.85 4.35
Change in imports, instrumented 1763 87 4.96 13.48
Change in exports 1763 87 2.25 2.85
Change in exports, instrumented 1763 87 2.75 6.37
2005–2008
Change in imports 1772 87 3.84 11.86
Change in imports, instrumented 1772 87 4.08 12.38
Change in exports 1772 87 5.21 5.58
Change in exports, instrumented 1772 87 2.36 6.50
Notes: Trade exposure measured according to equations (1) to (4), com-
bining trade data from the BACI Database and employment data from
the Sample of Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB). The table
shows the values for our regression sample, measured in 1000 (year-
2000) euros per worker. Sampling weights are employed. N est. gives
the number of establishments and N ind. the number of distinct 3-digit
manufacturing industries.
of the respective intervals, the net change matches quite well the overall decline in CBAs
that we observe in the entire sample (see Figure 2, Panel (b)). This holds true both for
the entire period and the diﬀerent intervals, with the exception of the interval 1999–2002
when the population average coverage rate stayed fairly ﬂat while we observe net entry into
industry-wide agreements in our regression sample. Recall that discrepancies between the
total decline and the one observed in our regression sample mainly arise because we only
capture within-establishment changes and not the ones arising from establishment turnover.
With respect to trade exposure, it becomes apparent that we see an increasing growth
in the average export penetration over time in our regression sample. Starting with a
change in exports per capita of about 890 euros between 1996 and 1999, it rises to more
than 5,000 euro in the period from 2005 to 2008. In contrast, changes in import exposure
are, on average, more stable over time, ﬂuctuating between 1,850 euros per worker and
3,840 euros per worker across the 3-year intervals. While the average change in imports per
capita exceeds the average change in exports per capita in the two earlier intervals, this
trend reverses in the latter two intervals. Note that these average changes mask substantial
heterogeneity across narrow industries, which we exploit in our empirical analysis.
Empirical specification To analyze the eﬀect of the rise in trade exposure on establishment-
level responses with respect to their bargaining regime, we relate the dependent variable,
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∆CBit, at the establishment level to changes in our import and export measures, ∆IM
East
jt
and ∆EXEastjt , at the industry level. More speciﬁcally, we estimate variants of the following
regression model:
∆CBit = β0 + β1∆IM
East
jt + β2∆EX
East
jt + β3Xit + δr + γk + µt + ǫit, (5)
where i denotes the ﬁrm, j the three-digit industry, and t the time period. We control
for a rich set of start-of-period establishment-level characteristics, Xit, that have been
identiﬁed to be relevant for the choice of the bargaining regime (Kohaut and Schnabel,
2003 and Schnabel et al., 2006). These are: establishment size (10 categories) and age
(dummy indicating whether the establishment is younger than 6 years), information on the
existence of a works council and the plant’s legal form, information on whether the plant is
a single-unit plant, whether it engages in exporting, information on its technological status
(dummy indicating whether the plant reports to have a technological status that is above
the industry average), the share of low-educated workers and the share of employees with
ﬁxed-term contracts. We further include the start-of-period collective bargaining status to
account for the fact that, by construction, initially covered plants can only remain covered
or exit (but not enter), while initially uncovered plants can only remain uncovered or enter
(but not exit). We report descriptive statistics of plant-level control variables in Table 9 in
the Appendix. Moreover, we add a full set of time dummies (µt) as well as regional (federal
state, δr) and two-digit industry dummies (γk). Given that we consider a speciﬁcation in
ﬁrst diﬀerences, these dummies capture region-speciﬁc and industry-speciﬁc time trends,
respectively. The main coeﬃcients of interest are β1 and β2. Estimated by OLS, they would
capture the causal eﬀect of rising trade exposure on plant-speciﬁc changes in the bargaining
regime only if ∆IMEastjt and ∆EX
East
jt were fully exogenous. Since this is unlikely, we
instrument these measures as outlined above. Note that the direction of the endogeneity
bias is a priori unclear. If a negative cost shock (e.g. due to past bargaining “mistakes”),
leads to both increased opting-out of collective bargaining as well as an increase in imports,
OLS estimation would lead to a downward bias in the import exposure coeﬃcient. In
contrast, a positive productivity or demand shock that leads to both more imports as well
as less opting-out, would lead to an upward bias of the OLS estimate. For statistical
inference, we cluster standard errors at the three-digit industry level to account for serial
correlation of the error term within industries, both in the cross-section and over time.
6 Results
We now report regression results pertaining to diﬀerent variants of regression equation (5).
We start with our baseline results, then explore heterogeneous eﬀects along diﬀerent di-
mensions, before subjecting our results to a series of robustness checks.
Baseline results Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3 report the OLS results of speciﬁca-
tion (5), where the former only has the baseline control variables – the strata-deﬁning sets
of dummy variables for region, industry, and establishment size class as well as year dum-
mies and a dummy for initial collective bargaining coverage – and the latter adds the full
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set of establishment control variables. It can be seen that a rise in import competition from
the East is associated with a signiﬁcant increase in establishments’ probability of leaving
industry-wide bargaining agreements. In contrast, an increase in export exposure is not
correlated with a plant’s change of the collective bargaining regime. With respect to the in-
cluded control variables, the results suggest that single-unit establishments are more likely
to leave centralized wage agreements. Perhaps surprisingly, exporting plants are found to
be more likely to exit from collective agreements, too. This is in line with previous evidence
by Capuano et al. (2014) according to which exporting establishments are less likely to be
covered by collective bargaining conditional on plant size. A (speculative) explanation that
we already alluded to earlier could be that the threat of relocating parts of the production
abroad is arguably more credible for exporting than for purely domestic plants, given that
the former are already globally connected. On the other hand, the results show that plants
with a works council and those that are sole proprietorships or partnerships (as opposed
to belonging to corporations) are less likely to opt out of centralized bargaining regimes.
With respect to workforce composition, we do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship between the
share of low-skilled and ﬁxed-term workers, respectively, and the probability of changing
the bargaining regime. Finally, we ﬁnd – as expected – that establishment size is negatively
related to the probability of leaving industry-wide collective agreements.19
We now turn to the results of the IV estimation (cf. columns (3) and (4)). The key
results of the ﬁrst-stage regression are provided at the bottom of Table 3 and indicate that
the instrument for our import measure is strong, with an F-test statistic above the common
rule of thumb of ten. This does not hold true for the instrument of export exposure, which
shows a ﬁrst-stage F-test statistic of only 7.34 and 7.44, respectively.20, 21 We therefore
need to exert some caution when interpreting the results pertaining to exporting. Turning
to our second-stage results, the import coeﬃcient in columns (3) and (4) is again negative
and statistically signiﬁcant. It is even larger in absolute terms than the corresponding
OLS estimate. This suggests that the OLS coeﬃcient is rather (upward) biased towards
zero, which could either be due to measurement error or to unobserved demand shocks
that cause both increased imports as well as less pressure to leave industry-wide bargaining
agreements. Note that we still do not ﬁnd any eﬀect related to the export channel, the point
estimate actually being zero. In terms of economic magnitude, our IV estimate implies
that an increase in import penetration from the East by 1,000 euros per worker increases
19We include dummies for 10 establishment size groups. Results are not shown for the sake of space, but they
are available upon request.
20We report Sanderson-Windmeijer F-tests for multiple endogenous variables (Sanderson and Windmeijer,
2016), which are constructed along the lines of the suggestion by Angrist and Pischke (2009).
21In general, our first-stage F statistics are lower than the ones of other papers making use of similar types
of instruments (e.g. Dauth et al., 2014). A likely reason is that we use a fairly demanding specification for
identification, where we restrict attention to the manufacturing sector only and exploit variation across three-
digit industries (in the cross section and over time) while controlling for two-digit industry fixed effects. For
comparison, Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2014) only include dummies for four higher-order regions in
their (baseline) local labor market-level regressions. Indeed, if we drop the two-digit industry fixed effects, the
first-stage F statistics increase substantially, while the point estimates in the second stage are very similar (but
more precisely estimated). We nevertheless prefer the specification with two-digit industry fixed effects for two
main reasons. First, it allows us to control for (possibly confounding) trends across broader industry groups.
Second, and as already discussed, since the industry (even though at a more aggregate level) is one dimension
that defines the sampling strata, we thereby account for the sampling probability of establishments.
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Table 3. Eﬀects of trade exposure on changes in CBAs: baseline results
Dependent variable: Change in industry-wide collective bargaining status at the plant level
∆CBit takes the value −1 for plants leaving collective agreements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
Import exposure −0.0017∗∗∗ −0.0018∗∗∗ −0.0031∗∗ −0.0031∗∗ −0.0032∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0016)
Export exposure −0.0006 −0.0007 −0.0002 −0.0000
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0019) (0.0018)
Net import exposure −0.0026∗∗
(0.0011)
Collective agreement (0/1) −0.2833∗∗∗ −0.3017∗∗∗ −0.2835∗∗∗ −0.3021∗∗∗ −0.3021∗∗∗ −0.3022∗∗∗
(0.0165) (0.0158) (0.0163) (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0156)
Works council (0/1) 0.0764∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0770∗∗∗ 0.0767∗∗∗
(0.0141) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0139)
Young plant (0/1) −0.0135 −0.0141 −0.0141 −0.0144
(0.0152) (0.0151) (0.0151) (0.0150)
Plant age: missing (0/1) 0.0108 0.0108 0.0108 0.0109
(0.0212) (0.0209) (0.0209) (0.0210)
Single plant (0/1) −0.0502∗∗∗ −0.0502∗∗∗ −0.0502∗∗∗ −0.0496∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0139) (0.0139)
Sole proprietor / partnership (0/1) 0.0222∗ 0.0215∗ 0.0215∗ 0.0222∗
(0.0116) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0114)
Exporter (0/1) −0.0178∗∗ −0.0177∗∗ −0.0177∗∗ −0.0176∗∗
(0.0090) (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0088)
Technology above average (0/1) 0.0043 0.0041 0.0041 0.0040
(0.0113) (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.0112)
Share of low-skilled workers −0.0173 −0.0167 −0.0167 −0.0168
(0.0165) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163)
Share of ﬁxed-term workers 0.0023 0.0022 0.0022 0.0026
(0.0482) (0.0481) (0.0481) (0.0483)
N 5342 5342 5342 5342 5342 5342
R2 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16
First stage, import exposure
Import (other countries) 0.2841∗∗∗ 0.2839∗∗∗ 0.2417∗∗∗
(0.0604) (0.0603) (0.0696)
Export (other countries) −0.1656∗∗∗ −0.1653∗∗∗
(0.0602) (0.0599)
Net import (other countries) 0.2992∗∗∗
(0.0385)
Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test 18.23 18.25 12.05 60.54
First stage, export exposure
Import (other countries) −0.0122 −0.0124
(0.0243) (0.0242)
Export (other countries) 0.1410∗∗∗ 0.1414∗∗∗
(0.0435) (0.0433)
Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test 7.34 7.44
Notes: Regressions are based on four stacked 3-year windows from 1996 to 2008. Establishment controls are measured at the start
of each window. All regressions include a constant and dummy variables for 10 plant-size groups, the region (federal state) of
the workplace, the 2-digit industry, and the time period. First-stage regressions include the same set of control variables as the
corresponding second stage. Standard errors (clustered at the 3-digit industry level) are given in parentheses. ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05,
∗∗∗p<0.01.
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Table 4. Heterogeneous eﬀects: plant size
Dependent variable: Change in industry-wide collective bargaining status at the plant level
∆CBit takes the value −1 for plants leaving collective agreements
(1) (2) (3)
Small Medium Large
Import exposure -0.0034∗ -0.0043∗ -0.0024
(0.0018) (0.0025) (0.0019)
Export exposure -0.0034 -0.0017 0.0070∗
(0.0041) (0.0036) (0.0041)
Establishment controls YES YES YES
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
N 2571 1275 1496
R2 0.20 0.18 0.12
First-stage Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test
Imports 6.85 9.51 38.71
Exports 5.44 7.01 8.27
Notes: Plant size groups are defined as follows: small: < 50 workers; medium: ≥ 50 and < 200
workers; large: ≥ 200 workers. All regressions include a constant, a full set of establishment-level
control variables as in Table 3 and complete sets of dummy variables for 10 plant-size groups, the
region (federal state) of the workplace, the 2-digit industry, and the time period. First-stage regres-
sions include the same set of control variables as the corresponding second stage. Standard errors
(clustered at the 3-digit industry level) are given in parentheses. ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01.
(decreases) a plants’ probability of leaving (joining) industry-wide bargaining agreements
by 0.31 percentage points. A back-of-the-envelope calculation therefore suggests that a
cumulative increase in import exposure of 13,300 euros per worker, which corresponds to the
manufacturing-wide increase over the entire period, yields a change in collective bargaining
coverage of 4.13 percentage points. Put into perspective, this amounts to 19 percent of the
observed total decline in industry-wide collective bargaining coverage in the manufacturing
sector from 1996 to 2008 (cf. Figure 3).
One concern might be that the estimation results for importing and exporting could
suﬀer from a high collinearity between these two variables. However, we obtain very sim-
ilar results to our baseline speciﬁcation if we consider only imports or net imports as our
instrumented trade shock variables. The respective results are shown in columns (5) and
(6) of Table 3.
Heterogeneous effects We now turn to heterogeneous eﬀects and analyze which types
of establishments react strongest – in terms of changing their bargaining regime – to the
increase in trade exposure. Following our reasoning in Section 3, we expect the import eﬀect
to be strongest for smaller, less productive establishments. The mechanism we have in mind
is that increased import competition puts a particular pressure on the least competitive
plants in an industry. Thus, for them, the wage ﬂoor imposed by centralized collective
bargaining agreements should become increasingly binding, leading to growing exit rates.
Likewise, we expect their employees to be more likely to accept an opting-out decision if
these establishments face the credible threat of going bankrupt or the need to downsize
production.
Unfortunately, obtaining proper measures of productivity is diﬃcult with the data at
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hand. First of all, information on establishment sales is missing for a non-negligible –
and probably non-random – fraction of establishments. Second, information on the capital
stock is not available. Although imputation procedures have been proposed in the literature,
they would certainly give rise to measurement error. Therefore, we focus on heterogeneous
eﬀects by establishment size. Note that heterogeneous-ﬁrm trade theory (Melitz, 2003)
postulates that ﬁrm size (in terms of revenues or employment) is a power function of ﬁrm
productivity.22 We estimate the regression model (5) separately for three diﬀerent plant-size
groups: small (< 50 workers), medium-sized (≥ 50 and < 200 workers), and large (> 200
workers).
Results are shown in Table 4. Consistent with our prior expectations, we ﬁnd that in
particular small (< 50 workers) and medium-sized (≥ 50 and < 200 workers) plants are
likely to leave an industry-wide agreement in response to an increase in low-wage import
competition. For large establishments, this eﬀect is smaller in magnitude and not signiﬁcant.
At the same time, we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of a change in export
exposure for large establishments only, suggesting that an increase in export opportunities
makes large plants less likely to opt out of a collective agreement. This is in line with the
notion that in particular large and highly productive plants beneﬁt from increased export
opportunities. This makes it less likely that they leave centralized collective agreements. We
interpret these heterogeneous eﬀects by establishment size as supportive of the notion that
we are indeed capturing eﬀects of ﬁnal goods trade as opposed to oﬀshoring (or threats to
relocate production). In the latter case, we would expect in particular larger establishments
to leave centralized wage bargaining, as these are the ones that can credibly threat to
relocate production.23 That is, however, not what we ﬁnd in the data. Importantly, this
does not mean that the oﬀshoring channel is not important or does not exist, but it does
not seem to be what we pick up with our import exposure variable.
With respect to further heterogeneous eﬀects at the plant level, one might expect that
the low-skill intensity of the workforce matters for the impact of increased trade exposure
on the probability of changing the bargaining regime. There are two reasons for this conjec-
ture. First, low-skill-intensive establishments might be the ones that suﬀer the most from
increased competition from low-wage countries. Second, collective agreements are generally
more binding for low-skilled than for high-skilled workers (see Dustmann and Schönberg,
2009), which would increase the incentives of plants that employ a relatively large share
of low-skilled workers to leave collective agreements. To shed light on this dimension of
heterogeneity, we split the sample in two groups at the median low-skill intensity (using
the ratio of low-skilled workers relative to high skilled workers) and repeat the analysis for
both groups. Table 5 displays the results. Diﬀerent to our presumption, however, we ﬁnd
that the two respective groups of plants are aﬀected very similarly, showing almost identical
point estimates and the same level of statistical signiﬁcance.
One possible explanation could be that, while plants with a high share of low-skilled
22As an alternative, we have also constructed a mark-up measure as sales over total costs, assuming that
more productive establishments have larger mark-ups (e.g. Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008). Although sample size
is somewhat reduced due to the aforementioned missing values in the sales variable, results are similar to the
ones relying on establishment size. Results are available upon request.
23There is strong evidence that the most productive and largest firms within an industry self-select into
offshoring (as summarized in, e.g., Egger et al., 2015a).
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Table 5. Heterogeneous eﬀects: low-skill intensity
Dependent variable: Change in industry-wide collective bargaining status at the plant level
∆CBit takes the value −1 for plants leaving collective agreements
(1) (2)
Low-skill intensity Low-skill intensity
below median above median
Import exposure -0.0035∗ -0.0033∗
(0.0021) (0.0018)
Export exposure -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0031) (0.0023)
Establishment controls YES YES
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS
N 2743 2599
R2 0.16 0.18
First-stage Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test
Imports 7.29 29.71
Exports 5.12 9.76
Notes: Low-skill intensity is defined as ratio of low-skilled workers to high-skilled workers. All
regressions include a constant, a full set of establishment-level control variables as in Table 3 and
complete sets of dummy variables for 10 plant-size groups, the region (federal state) of the workplace,
the 2-digit industry, and the time period. First-stage regressions include the same set of control
variables as the corresponding second stage. Standard errors (clustered at the 3-digit industry level)
are given in parentheses. ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01.
employees might be more strongly aﬀected by low-wage country competition, they might
also be confronted with a stronger opposition from their workforce if they want to leave
centralized bargaining, as collective wages are binding for a larger fraction of employees.
Robustness checks In the following, we run several robustness checks, which are summa-
rized in Table 6. First, we restrict our analysis to single-unit plants only (shown in column
(1)), thereby taking into account that decisions on collective agreements are usually formed
at the ﬁrm as opposed to the plant level. The estimated eﬀect of an increase in import pene-
tration on ﬁrms’ propensity to opt out of industry-wide collective agreement is still positive
and signiﬁcant and even slightly larger in absolute terms than in our baseline speciﬁcation
with the full sample. This suggests that our establishment-level analysis approximates the
decisions taken at the ﬁrm level reasonably well.
Next, we focus on the risk set of establishments that could potentially leave collective
bargaining and restrict our sample to plants that have been covered by a industry-wide
collective agreement at the beginning of each time window. In this speciﬁcation our de-
pendent variable, ∆CBit, can therefore only take the values −1 for CBA leavers and 0 for
CBA stayers. Moreover, the number of observations reduces signiﬁcantly (from 5,342 in the
baseline to 2,569 in this speciﬁcation). Column (2) shows the results. We estimate roughly
similar coeﬃcients as in our baseline speciﬁcation, albeit with less statistical precision. We
take this as supporting evidence for the validity of our symmetry assumption which is im-
plicit in our baseline estimation, i.e. the assumption that the explanatory variables have a
symmetric eﬀect on the probabilities of leaving and joining, respectively, industry-wide bar-
gaining agreements. Comfortingly, we also obtain qualitatively the same results regarding
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Table 6. Robustness checks I
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Single-unit
plants
Initially
covered
plants
Final goods
only
Panel
survival
Dependent variable: Change in industry-wide CBA Panel survival
Import exposure -0.0037∗∗ -0.0035 -0.0032∗ 0.0009
(0.0016) (0.0022) (0.0017) (0.0009)
Export exposure -0.0011 0.0030 -0.0001 0.0015
(0.0020) (0.0039) (0.0017) (0.0044)
Establishment controls YES YES YES YES
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
N 3899 2569 5342 9227
R2 0.17 0.11 0.16 0.03
First-stage Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test
Imports 17.55 43.52 10.00 17.92
Exports 9.98 7.92 6.27 10.04
Notes: All regressions include a constant, a full set of establishment-level control variables as in Table 3 and
complete sets of dummy variables for 10 plant-size groups, the region (federal state) of the workplace, the
2-digit industry, and the time period. First-stage regressions include the same set of control variables as the
corresponding second stage. Standard errors (clustered at the 3-digit industry level) are given in parentheses.
∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01.
the heterogeneous eﬀects by establishment size when restricting the sample to single-unit
plants and to establishments initially covered by a collective agreements, respectively (see
Table 10 in the Appendix).
As a further robustness check, we restrict attention to ﬁnal goods imports. One might
think that imported intermediates have a diﬀerent eﬀect on German ﬁrms, potentially lead-
ing to lower marginal costs and less pressure to leave collective bargaining. To distinguish
ﬁnal goods imports from intermediate goods imports, we rely on the German input-output
table from the pre-sample period 1995. Speciﬁcally, we calculate the share of imports orig-
inating from a given two-digit industry abroad that is not used as an input in any (other)
two-digit industry (similar to Autor et al., 2013 and Dauth et al., 2014). We apply this
share to all three-digit industries within a given two-digit industry. The instruments are
adjusted accordingly. As this transformation is less straightforward for our measure of ex-
port exposure, we leave the latter unchanged. Restricting attention to ﬁnal goods imports
hardly aﬀects the regression results (column (3)).
Given our regression set-up, one further concern could be related to panel attrition.
Although the average response rate of the survey is quite high (about 80 percent), we
still lose establishments over our three-year windows. Panel attrition could lead to biased
estimates if it is not random but correlated with our main variables of interest. In particular,
we would expect to underestimate our main eﬀect (the β1 coeﬃcient) if an increase in import
penetration is positively related to panel attrition, implying that such an increase induces
some (low-productivity) establishments not only to exit a collective agreement but also
to disappear from the panel. We analyze this possibility by regressing a dummy variable
of plant survival (which takes the value 1 if a plant observed in t is still in the panel in
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Table 7. Robustness checks II: migration
Dependent variable: Change in industry-wide collective bargaining status at the plant level
∆CBit takes the value −1 for plants leaving collective agreements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Baseline Excluding
border
districts
Controlling
for
migration
Controlling
for
migration
Import exposure -0.0031∗∗ -0.0030∗ -0.0032∗∗ -0.0032∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Export exposure -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0000 0.0000
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
Level of migrants / total workforce -0.4722
(0.6240)
Change in level of migrants / total workforce 0.8737
(0.9385)
Establishment controls YES YES YES YES
Estimation method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
N 5342 4847 5342 5342
R2 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
First-stage Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test
Imports 18.25 18.04 18.30 18.67
Exports 7.44 7.14 7.43 7.58
Notes: In Column (3) we account for the level of migrants relative to the total workforce at the district level.
We consider migrants in the age of 18 to 65 from all countries that are considered as “the East“ in our analysis.
The total number of the workforce at the district level refers to the year 1995 and is held fix. In Column (4)
we control for the change in the level of migrants over period ∆ relative to the total number of workers at the
district level. All regressions include a constant, a full set of establishment-level control variables as in Table 3
and complete sets of dummy variables for 10 plant-size groups, the region (federal state) of the workplace, the
2-digit industry, and the time period. First-stage regressions include the same set of control variables as the
corresponding second stage. Standard errors (clustered at the 3-digit industry level) are given in parentheses.
∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01.
t+∆ and 0 otherwise) on all covariates of our model.24 Column (4) of Table 6 shows the
results. As can be seen, both trade shock coeﬃcients are close to zero and not statistically
signiﬁcant. We therefore conclude that panel attrition does not confound our analysis.
Our ﬁnal robustness check relates to migration, which is one potentially confounding
factor that we have not addressed so far. That is, not only did German trade exposure to
the East grow substantially during our period of analysis, but the German labor market
also attracted many migrants, especially from Central and Eastern Europe.25 Arguably,
this migration inﬂow could also have inﬂuenced German employers and employees to agree
upon leaving collective wage regimes, given that the implied increase in labor supply might
have aﬀected the bargaining position of establishments vis-a-vis their incumbent workers.
Note, however, that this potential channel would only be a threat to our identiﬁcation
strategy if migration did not only inﬂuence the establishments’ choice of the bargaining
regime, but was also correlated with trade ﬂows between the East and our instrument
countries. One potential mechanism for this to be the case could be, for example, that
workers from comparative-advantage sectors in the Eastern countries migrate to Germany
24Unfortunately, it is not feasible to run a true selection model since this would require a valid exclusion
restriction, which is difficult to come by in the setting at hand.
25Although Germany restricted the freedom of movement of citizens from the new EU member states, a sizable
number of migrants already arrived during the 2000s (see e.g. Haug, 2004 and Elsner and Zimmermann, 2013).
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seeking employment in the same sectors or in those regions where these sectors predominate.
In this scenario, trade ﬂows from the East to other countries would go hand in hand with
migration from the East to Germany. To rule this mechanism out, we consider the following
robustness checks. First, we exclude all plants from our analysis that are located in a district
at the eastern border of Germany (column (2)). Since migration is generally concentrated at
regions which are relatively close to the home country (for this distance pattern of migration
from Central and Eastern European countries to Germany, see e.g. Lehmann and Nagl,
2018), we thereby exclude those plants that are arguably most strongly aﬀected by migration
from the East. Second, we use the full sample, but include additional controls to account
for the number of migrants from the East at the district level. Speciﬁcally, we either control
for the start-of-period share of migrants from the East in total employment (column (3))
or for the change in the share of migrants in total employment over our three-year period
(column (4)).26 Note that we do not aim at a causal identiﬁcation of the migration channel
itself, which would require us to use proper instruments for the district-speciﬁc migration
ﬂows, but focus on how the inclusion of these variables aﬀects the estimated trade exposure
eﬀects. The results, which are shown in Table 7, show that neither the exclusion of plants
at the border nor the control for migrants at the district level aﬀects our main results. We
therefore conclude that the trade eﬀect we capture in our analysis is not confounded by
simultaneous migration ﬂows to Germany.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we shed light on a hitherto unexplored dimension of establishments’ adjust-
ment to increased import competition. Using rich establishment-level data from Germany
over the period from 1996 to 2008, we analyze how establishments change their collective
bargaining status in response to stronger trade exposure. We show that establishments
facing stronger import competition from China and Eastern Europe are more likely to leave
industry-wide collective bargaining, thereby contributing to the increased decentralization
of wage negotiations. We ﬁnd that in particular small and medium-sized establishments
have reacted to increased import competition in this way. In contrast, and as expected, we
do not ﬁnd any eﬀect of stronger export exposure on establishments’ likelihood of leaving
industry-wide bargaining.
A back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that about 19 percent of the entire decline in
industry-wide collective bargaining coverage in the German manufacturing sector over the
period of analysis from 1996 to 2008 can be explained by the increase in import competition
from China and Eastern Europe.
Previous literature has shown that the decline in collective bargaining coverage matters
for a wide range of economic and labor market outcomes. Among others, it has been
identiﬁed as a major source of increasing wage dispersion. In this paper, we have identiﬁed
an important driving factor of this decline.
At a more general level, the following conclusions can be drawn from our analysis.
First, labor market institutions do not only shape comparative advantage and, hence, trade
26Details on how we construct the variables at the district level are provided in the Appendix.
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patterns, but are themselves endogenous with respect to international trade. Second, the
decline in collective bargaining seems to constitute one potentially important channel link-
ing international trade and labor market outcomes – and one that is likely to have long-term
consequences. Exploring in detail the link between international trade, the decline in collec-
tive bargaining, and labor market outcomes seems to be fruitful avenue for future research.
Also, it would be interesting to compare the German experience to other countries.
Our interpretation of the results for Germany is that trade exposure has increased the
dispersion of ﬁrm proﬁtability within industries, which has made it increasingly diﬃcult
to form “one-size-ﬁts-all” collective agreements at the industry level. While there is broad
evidence on the diﬀerential impact of globalization across heterogeneous ﬁrms in terms of
sales and proﬁts in many countries (Melitz and Redding, 2014), the reaction pattern in
terms of collective bargaining regimes will likely depend on the exact institutional set-up,
i.e. on issues such as the predominant level of bargaining (ﬁrm, sectoral, or national) and
the degree of ﬂexibility of collective agreements.
From a policy perspective, our research gives rise to the question how to react to an
increasing erosion of the system of industrial relations in face of rising globalization pres-
sures. One might argue that in the German setting, both unions and policy makers have
already reacted to this development: unions by increasingly allowing for wage ﬂexibility
within collective agreements, policy makers by introducing a statutory minimum wage to
secure a wage ﬂoor previously largely upheld by collective agreements.
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Appendix
Input-output data
To diﬀerentiate between total imports and ﬁnal goods imports, we make use of the German
input-output table of the year 1995, which is provided by the German Statistical Oﬃce.
Similar to Autor et al. (2013) and Dauth et al. (2014), we use information on the shares of
world imports (by two-digit industry) that are used for consumption or investment rather
than as an input by any industry. We multiply these shares with German imports from
Eastern Europe and China, applying the same share to all three-digit industries in a given
two-digit industry. We adjust the instruments accordingly.
Migration data
Information on the number of migrants at the district level is provided by the German
Statistical Oﬃce. In particular, we make use of the Central Register of Foreigners. This
data set contains information on the stock of migrants by year, nationality, age, and gender
at the district level. It covers the period from 1998 to 2014. For the years 1996 and 1997 the
number of migrants by nationality, age, and gender is only available at a more aggregate
level of German regions. We therefore impute the number of migrants at the district level
for these two years, assuming that the distribution of migrants across districts is the same
as in 1998. Moreover, we adjust the data taking all regional reforms at the district level
into account (Gebietsreformen).
In order to construct our migration control variables, we consider all migrants in the
age group 18 to 65 from all countries that are considered “the East” in our analysis (China,
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, the Russian Fed-
eration, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kaza-
khstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). We normalize the total
number of migrants (and the change in the total number of migrants) by the total number
of workers at the district level. We extract the latter information from the SIAB data set
(Sample of Integrated Labor Market Biographies, provided by the IAB). The denominator
is ﬁxed as of the year 1995.
Imputation of collective bargaining status
To ensure that we capture permanent changes in the bargaining status and not only tempo-
rary or spurious ones (e.g. short-term exits that are only used to achieve a better bargaining
position and which are therefore followed by a reentry in the next period), we explicitly
check the data for such patterns and impute the CBA variable in these cases. In particular,
we do so if a plant reports to change its bargaining status in two consecutive years, e.g. if
a plant reports to be covered in period 0 and period 2 but to be uncovered in period 1 (of
course, we equally consider changes in the opposite direction). In such a case, we ignore
the ﬁrst change and impute the CBA variable such that this particular plant is covered in
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all three periods.27 On the entire data set, the imputation aﬀects between 1.04 and 2.65
percent of all observations per year. With respect to the regression windows of our baseline
speciﬁcation, less than 4 percent of changes (∆CBit) are aﬀected by this procedure. We
run our speciﬁcations also with the original, non-imputed, CBA variable. Our results are
largely stable to this adjustment.
27As soon as a plant reports three changes in a row (which is very rarely observed), we do not impute, but
only flag these observations and exclude these plants in a robustness check. The whole set of our results remains
unaffected.
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Table 8. Most aﬀected industries by import exposure per worker
Industry Change in trade volumes p.w.
177 Manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles 217.56
365 Manufacture of games and toys 177.94
300 Manufacture of oﬃce machinery and computers 140.01
323 Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods 79.95
321 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components 54.04
152 Processing and preserving of ﬁsh and ﬁsh products 50.81
274 Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals 48.06
322 Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy 42.65
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 34.85
364 Manufacture of sports goods 34.56
343 Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines 34.42
174 Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel 33.87
193 Manufacture of footwear 32.76
314 Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 28.48
342 Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semitrailers 27.06
316 Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c. 27.01
312 Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus 25.92
313 Manufacture of insulated wire and cable 25.19
154 Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats 24.36
192 Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness 22.39
Notes: Changes in import exposure per worker measured according to equation (1), combining trade data from the BACI Database and employment data from the Sample
of Integrated Employment Biographies (SIAB). The table shows changes between 1996 and 2008, measured in 1000 (year-2000) euros per worker.
3
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Table 9. Descriptive statistics: establishment-level control variables (pooled)
N mean sd
Industry-wide collective agreement (0/1) 5342 0.463 0.499
Works council (0/1) 5342 0.119 0.324
Young plant (0/1) 5342 0.065 0.246
Plant age: missing (0/1) 5342 0.349 0.477
Single plant (0/1) 5342 0.917 0.276
Sole proprietorship or partnership (0/1) 5342 0.540 0.498
Exporter (0/1) 5342 0.226 0.419
Technology above average (0/1) 5342 0.159 0.366
Share of low-skilled workers 5342 0.306 0.309
Share of ﬁxed-term workers 5342 0.015 0.053
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, regression sample. Notes: The
descriptives are pooled across the four stacked 3-year windows from
1996 to 2008 and measured at the start of each window. Sampling
weights are employed.
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Table 10. Robustness checks: heterogeneous eﬀects by plant size
Dependent variable: Change in industry-wide collective bargaining status at the plant level
∆CBit takes the value −1 for plants leaving collective agreements
Single-unit plants only Initially covered plants only
Plant size Plant size
Small Medium Large Small Medium Large
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Import exposure -0.0035∗ -0.0047 -0.0025 -0.0088∗ -0.0058 -0.0024
(0.0018) (0.0028) (0.0020) (0.0052) (0.0042) (0.0017)
Export exposure -0.0038 -0.0066 0.0135 -0.0022 -0.0009 0.0081
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0095) (0.0126) (0.0056) (0.0062)
Establishment controls YES YES YES YES YES YES
Estimation Method 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS
N 2299 937 663 770 638 1161
R2 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.09
First stage Sanderson-Windmeijer F-test
Imports 8.26 15.34 146.12 23.19 9.61 99.95
Exports 8.38 10.88 8.43 10.75 5.38 7.30
Notes: All regressions include a constant, a full set of start-of-period establishment-level control variables as in
Table 3 and a complete set of time, region and 2-digit-industry dummies as well as indicators for 10 plant-size
groups. First stage regressions include the same set of control variables as the corresponding second stage. Levels
of significance: ∗p<0.10, ∗∗p<0.05, ∗∗∗p<0.01. Standard errors (clustered at the 3-digit industry level) are given
in parentheses.
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